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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLARENCE P. MARTIN, 
• 
Plaintiff and A.ppellarnt, 
vs. 
RALPH L. JONES, dba MOUNT 
AIR PHARMACY, 
Defendant and RespDndent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACT'S 
Case No. 
7766 
Appellant's statement of facts, especially the se-
quence of events, is misleading and does not present a 
complete picture of the attending circumstances and 
evidence, which necessitates a further statement and 
reference to portions of the record. 
Defendant's store, 3005 Highland Drive, is located 
on the east side of the street facing west. While a por-
tion of the store is classified as semi-self help, such that 
customers in that portion of the store are allowed to 
handle and pick up merchandise, no such practice was 
followed or allowed in other sections, where customers 
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were prohibited, namely, the prescription room, cos-
metic counter, soda fountain, liquor bar and cash reg-
ister. The State Agency liquor bar, soda fountain and 
cash register used in connection therewith are located 
along the very north side of the store behind a counter 
running the entire length east and west completely sep-
arating these departments from the self-help portion 
of the store, as shown in Exhibit 2. No one could enter 
behind these counters without hurdling the counter ex-
cept through a very narrow aisle or passage eighteen 
inches in width between the: counters in front of the 
liquor store or bar and soda fountain (R. 65, 173). In 
this passageway, intended for employees only, there 
was a sign posted "NO ADl\1ITTANCE El\1PLOYEES 
ONLY." 
Plaintiff denied having seen this siin (R. 47), but 
acknowledged that he did ~ot particularly look for it 
(R. 67). On his next visit to the store, he said he could 
not help seeing it (R. 68). If it was there at the time 
of the accident, as defendant's employe:es all testified 
it was (R. 147, 148, 160, 166, ·173, 189), then plaintiff 
could not have helped seeing it, when he went behind 
the counter, had he been observant. Similar signs were 
by the prescription counter and rest room doors, etc. 
where patrons were not allowed (R. 173, 189). 
Plaintiff's Knowledge 
Whether plaintiff saw the sign or not, he knew the 
situation in the store and the. segregation of the depart-
ments above mentioned. He was a mature man, forty-six 
years of age, a salesman for Alsco, lived in the immediate 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
neighborhood and had been in the store a number of 
times. He occasionally purchased liquor over the sarne 
counter (R. 63). He ad1nitted having on a prior occasion 
gone in the prescription department and was ex_pressly 
U)arned to keep out. He knew custom.ers were not per-
mitted behind the liquor counter. We quote his testi-
mony fron1 the record: 
·~Q. You had been in the Mount Air Pharmacy 
a number of times before November, the 11th 
day of November, the day of this accident~ 
"A. A number of thnes, yes. 
"Q. And on any of those p·rior occasions had you 
ever been behind that liquor counter~ 
" .. A... Never been behind it, no. 
• * • 
"Q. Had you ever seen any other patrons behind 
that counter, or any one other than the per-
sons who \Vere working there·~ 
"A. I don't remember seeing anyone. 
"Q. There were other places in the store where 
patrons did not ordinarily go, were there not? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. You had never been behind the fountain to 
the east of the liquor counter~ 
"A. No. 
"Q. And I think you had been in the prescription 
department~ 
"A. I was in there one time. Mr. Jones told me 
he did not want anyone behind there, so I 
went out." (R. 63) 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Q. S.o, before the accident happened there were 
at least three places in the store where you 
had never seen any patrons or customers; 
behind the liquor counter, and the fountain, 
and the prescription department, outside of 
the times you were there~ And Mr. Jones 
told you not to come behind that prescrip-
tion counter~ 
"A. That's right." (R. 64) 
* * * 
"Q. You had never seen, in your experience 
before the night of this accident, the general 
public, or individuals, persons who were not 
employees, behind counters in liquor stores, 
in close proximity to liquor bottles on those 
shelves, in any store you had been in~ 
* * * 
"A. No." (R. 68-69) 
Concerning the previous difficulty with plaintiff, 
Ralph L. Jones, the store manager, testified: 
"When he entered behind the prescription 
counter 've had to ask hin1 on two or three occa-
sions to please not come back there." (R. 155) 
(and Mrs. Ashley R. 189). 
So as not to confuse the cash register used for the 
fountain and liquor sales (R. 131) located near the west 
end of the soda fountain with the other cashier's stand, 
used in connection with the self-help area of the store, 
perhaps it should be pointed out that the latter was 
near the front center of the store in the self-help depart-
ment, shown Exhibit "F·". It was at this point that plain-
tiff had completed his original purchase of razor blades 
and N.R. tablets before going behind the liquor counter 
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where customers were not allowed. 
From plaintiff's testimony and the whole evidence, 
it was undisputed that custo1ners weTe not allowed 
behind the liquor and fountain counters, and no custom-
ers had been seen there, either by plain tiff or in the 
experience of defendant or defendant's clerks during the 
several months or years they were emp~loyed (Jones, R. 
12±, 127 ; Ashley, R. 188, 189; Cannon R. 172, 173). 
I 
The liquor department was closed on the day of the 
accident ( R. 52). 
There was no claim of active negligence against 
defendant, the only claim being for passive negligence 
or defective premises by reason of the hole or opening 
in the floor at the west end of the liquor counter through 
which plaintiff fell. This hole was originally made to 
accommodate a dumb waiter, but the use of the elevator 
as such had been discontinued (R. 156), the opening 
being used evenings 'vhen the liquor store was closed so 
employees could hoist liquor boxes from the basement 
to stock the shelves, and then at convenient times dispose 
of the empty cartons ( R. 151, 152, 169, 170). 
As shown in Exhibit 2, the pencils, pip·es and other 
merchandise on top of the liquor shelves against the wall 
were purely for display purposes (R. 126, 139, 140). 
These were seven to eight feet above the floor, "\Vhere 
most people could not reach (R. 189, 190), defendant 
himself reaching on tip toes when he stepped into the 
hole (R. 66). It was consideTed good merchandising 
that some of the items were removed from the display 
cards ( R. 197). 
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The same pencils were available in other portions 
of the store ( R. 181, 191, 192). 
Plaintiff's Theory 
Knowing customers we-r~ not allowed behind the 
liquor counter where he was injured, at the trial plain-
tiff Martin proceeded upon the theory, based solely on 
his own testimony, wherein he claimed that while he 
was still at the cashier's register located in the self-help 
department, he asked the lady clerk (presumably Mrs. 
Ashley or Mrs. Cannon) for a pencil, in response to 
which he was ·told, "They are up on top there," refer-
ring to the top of the liquor shelves behind. the counter 
(R. 43). That he, plaintiff, then proceeded in that direc-
tion (R. 44) saying, "I will get one," and that she, the 
clerk, followed him over (R. 45) right behind within 
two or three feet (R. 47). He could not recall which of 
the clerks served him (R. 71, 72). 
Conflict in Evidence 
In conflict with plaintiff's testimony and theory that 
he was effectually directed behind the counter by de-
fendant's employees, the clerks, namely, Mrs. Ashley 
and Mrs. Cannon, both testified to the contrary that 
Martin had completed his purchase of razor blades and 
N.R. tablets, and said nothing whatsoever about wanting 
a pencil. They were both busy serving other customers 
and neither knew plaintiff intended to do anything but 
leave the store until he was apprehended behind the 
liquor counter reaching for the display pencils at the 
very place where he was injured. When Mrs. Cannon 
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observed him, she left the eustomer she was then wait-
ing on and went over to get plaintiff, intending to usher 
him out from behind the counter as courteously as pos-
sible. 
The course of events is illustrated by the testimony 
of Mrs. Ashley and Mrs. Cannon. 
nirs. Ashley """as at the cash register near the front 
cente.r of the store (not the cash register behind the 
soda fountain) and Mrs. Cannon was near the rear of 
the store (R. 171). Mrs. Ashley explained she waited 
on plaintiff, Martin, when he came in the store. 
"A. I 'vaited on Mr. Martin first, and he appar-
ently had completed his purchase, and then 
I waited on the second customer, and then 
he interrupted my second customer I was 
waiting on to ask me for these particular 
tablets at the back of the store, and I was 
at the front of the store. !frs. Cannon .was 
in the same general depart1nen t, that these 
particular tablets were in, waiting on her 
customer, so I asked if she would bring up 
the tablets with the purchases her customer 
had made, which she did. 
"Q. I understand Mr. ~1artin had completed his 
purchases, before he asked for the tablets~ 
"A. That's right, yes he had. 
"Q. And did he pay you for the tablets 'vhen 
they were brought down to where you and 
Mr. Martin were 1 
"A. Yes. However, I was still taking care of n1y 
customer. I interrupted my customer to finish 
Mr. Martin's sale. 
"Q. And then what happened after that~ 
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"A. I was waiting on my customer, and as far 
as I knew Mr. Martin was completely fin-
ished. 
"Q. Did Mr. Martin say anything to you about 
any pencils~ 
"A. No, he did not ask for pencils; he asked for 
N.R. tablets only. 
"Q. Did he ask you where any fine line pencils 
were~ 
"A. No, he did not. 
"Q. Did you at any time while he was there, 
point over to the pencils over the liquor 
shelf~ 
"A. I am not in the habit of doing that; none 
of us are. 
"Q. What was the first thing you knew, or the 
first thing that gave you knowledge, the first 
intimation you had the accident had hap-
pened~ 
"A. I heard these bottles rattle on the. shelf-
fall off the shelf in the liquor department, 
and I had my back to it, and was finishing 
the sale to the customer, just ringing the 
cash register, and I also heard a groan. He 
did not scream, but a noise, and the noise of 
the bottles falling, and I turned around and 
Mrs. Cannon was standing there with her 
.hands in the air and Mr. Martin had fallen." 
(R. 186-7) 
Mrs. Cannon testified: 
"Q. And when was your attention first directed 
toward him, and how~ 
"A. Well I was waiting on a customer, and l\1rs. 
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Ashley called to me to bring some tablets 
back. 
"Q. And in what part of the store were you when 
you were waiting on this customer~ 
''A. I was in the back. 
"Q. And where was l\1rs. Ashley~ 
"A. She 'vas up at the front. 
"Q. Was she anywhere near the cash register~ 
"A. That is where she was. 
"Q.. What did you do~ 
"A. I brought the tablets down and then finished 
waiting on my customer I had before that. 
"Q. Now did you see l\1r. Martin when you 
brought the tablets down~ 
"A. Yes, I did. 
"Q. Where was he~ 
''A. Down by the cash register. 
"Q .. And was he being served by Mrs. Ashley at 
that time~ 
"A. He had purchased something from her, I 
think. 
"Q. What happened to the tablets you brought 
down~ Do you know who they were for; who 
got them~ 
"A. Yes, they were for Mr. Martin. 
"Q. Then what did you do after you left the 
tablets there ~ 
"A. I turned around and saw 1\Ir. Martin stand-
ing over behind the liquor counter. 
"Q. Where were you when you turned around 
and saw him behind the liquor counter~ 
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"A. I was at the cash register. 
"Q. And which cash register was that~ 
"A. The front one. 
"Q. And were you still waiting on the customer 
you told us about1 
"A. I was. 
"Q. Did you see l\{r. l\1artin walk from the cash 
register over to the place where you saw 
him standing behind the liquor counter~ 
"A. No, I did not. I figured he was through with 
his purchases. 
"Q. And what did you do when you saw him 
over there' 
"A. Well, being responsible for the liquor man, 
I walked over and asked him if I could help 
him. 
"Q. And what was he doing~ 
"A. He had a card of pencils, and he said, 'I want 
a pencil.' 
"Q. And then what happened? 
"A. He got a pencil off the card and then turned 
and put the card back on the shelf, and step-
ped back and fell down the hole." (R. 171-2) 
Mrs. c·annon further explained she at times assisted 
in the liquor department in stocking the shelves, throw-
ing out boxes and waiting on liquor customers (R. 174). 
We quote further from her testimony: 
"Q. Mrs. Cannon, did you say anything to Mr. 
Martin when you went over there, about not 
being behind the liquor counter~ 
"A. No, we try to be as courteous to the custom-
ers as we can. 'V e do not say, 'You are not 
10 
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allowed behind here.' vVe try to get thern 
out as nicely as we can. 
"Q. You did not ask hiln to leave~ 
''A. No, I figured on helping hhn and getting 
him out as quickly as I could without hurting 
his feelings. 
''Q. So in the interest of your employer you 
thought there wasn't any necessity of asking 
him to come away from that particular area~ 
"A. As long as I w·as there with him. 
"Q. Mrs. Cannon did you warn him of any danger 
in that vicinity J? 
"A. Well the hole \vas there. I figured he could 
see it. 
"Q. You could see it~ 
-'A. And he did not have his back to it. 
"Q. He had his face to it~ 
"A. He was to the side of it; he was not standing 
right by it. 
"Q. The light was good so you could see the hole 
there~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Now then, you said not a word to him about 
that~ 
"A. No, I didn't. I figured he could see it." 
(R. 179, 180) 
* * * 
"Q. 11rs. Cannon, were those same pencils and 
other merchandise on display on that liquor 
shelf, available in the counters in the center 
of the store~ 
"A. Yes, they were. 
11 
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"Q. And did you know that Mr. Martin was 
behind the counter until you turned around 
and saw him there~ 
"A. No, sir. I figured the N .R. tablets were all 
he wanted. 
"Q. Did you hear him say anything about any 
other merchandise when you brought the 
N.R. tablets down there~ 
"A. No, I am positive he did not say anything." 
(R. 181) 
* * * 
"Q. And on this occasion you were helping lVfr. 
Martin to get his pencil~ 
"A. No, I d'idn't help him get his pencil. lie 
helped himself. 
"Q. Your purpose in being over there was for 
that. 
"A. We are responsible for the liquor, as I said 
before, and so I went over there and tried 
to get him out as nicely as I could." (R. 183) 
It is evident from the foregoing that plaintiff was 
not actually or impliedly directed by either of the clerks 
but he took it upon himself to go behind the counter 
where he knew he should not be, and it was not until he 
was already to the side of the hole and had obtained 
a card of pencils in his hand that Mrs. Cannon went 
over in an effort to usher him out. This was in contrast 
to plaintiff's testimony that he was directed and accom-
panied by one of the clerks to his position near the man 
hole, where he fell, and that was the substantial con-
troversy and issue governing plaintiff's status as that 
of an invitee or trespasser or equivalent when he was 
12 
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injured. Under such testimony, the jury was entitled to 
believe the evidence of defendant that plaintiff did not 
ask for a pencil, and that he went behind the counter 
of his own volition without defendant's direction or 
knowledge. 
QUESTION INVOLVED 
The only question raised is the giving of the court's 
Instruction No. 9 as follows : 
"INSTRUCTION 9 
''If you find that the aisle behind the liquor 
counter was not intended for and was not a 
place used by custon1ers and patrons of defend-
ant and was intended and used only as a working 
area for use by defendant's employees, and that 
plainly visible signs were posted signifying the 
area was not for customers, and if you further 
find that plaintiff walked behind said counter to 
the vicinity of said opening, ·without the direction 
or consent of the defendant or his employees, 
then you are instructed that in walking behind 
said counter, plaintiff was a trespasser and took 
the premises as he found them, and defendant 
owed him no duty whatever with re.sp,ect to the 
existence of the opening, except to not wilfully or 
knowingly injure him, and he is not entitled to 
recover, and your verdict must be in favor of the 
defendant and against the plaintiff, No Cause of 
Action." ( R. 248) . 
The instruction should be considered in light of the 
issues and evidence of the parties developed and relied 
upon at the trial and in light of all of the instructions 
given by the court. The jury was specifically instructed 
to consider the instructions as a whole. (See Instruc-
13 
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tion 12-A, R. 252). So viewing the instructions, there 
was no error as the instructions given substantially and 
fairly stated the issues covering plaintiff's theory of 
implied consent. 
Other Instructions 
Instructions Nos. 5 to 8 read as follows: 
"IN,STRUCTION 5 
"The owner or operator of a retail store 
impliedly invites the public to enter upon the 
premises to inspect and purchase articles had, 
or displayed for sale. Plaintiff was an invitee 
in the Mount Air Pharmacy. The invitation which 
plaintiff thus impliedly received applied to that 
p-art of the store where goods are displayed for 
sale and business is ordinarily transacted. It 
extends to that part of the premises designed, 
adopted and prepared for the accommodation of 
customers, and to which customers may reason-
ably be expected to go; or to which he was 
expressly or impliedly given permission to go in 
furtherance of the objects or purpo-se for which 
he was originally invited to enter the store." 
(R. 244) 
"INSTRUCTION 6 
"It is the duty of the proprietor of a place 
of business which is open to public patronage 
to use ordinary care to provide reasonably safe 
floors, and to make safe for customers such part 
of the premises to which the customers have been 
expressly or impliedly invited to go." (R. 245) 
"INSTRUCTION 7 
"If you shall find and believe from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that plaintiff was 
or became an invitee, as defined in Instruction 
14 
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5, upon that part of the pre1nises where he re-
ceived his injury, then it becan1e defendant's 
duty to use ordinary and reasonable care to make 
such part of the premises safe for use by the 
plaintiff." (R. 246) 
"INSTRUCTION 8 
"While plaintiff entered upon defendant's 
pre1uises as an invitee, if he on his own volition 
went beyond the scope or extent of his invitation, 
and 'vent into parts of the premises not covered 
by his invitation as defined in Instruction 5, he 
there ceased to be an invitee, and at such place 
the proprietor owed him the duty only of not 
wilfully or knowingly harming him, or wilfully 
or knowingly exposing him, or wilfully or kno"\v-
ingly permitting him to expose himself, or to be 
exposed, to danger, and to warn him of hidden 
dangers known by the proprietor to exist." (R. 
247) 
These instructions considered with Instruction No. 
9 fairly presented the issue to the jury as to whether 
plaintiff under all of the circumstances was beyond 
the scope or extent of his invitation when the accident 
occurred. 
.ARGUMENT 
Clearly the scope of the original invitation in this 
case did not extend to plaintiff Martin's conduct when 
(after his purchases were completed and wrapped and 
paid for in the self-help department) he went without 
the consent, knowledge or direction of defendant or 
defendant's employees behind the counter of the State. 
Liquor Agency, where he, Martin, knew customers were 
15 
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not allowed or served. It was a place reserved for 
defendant's employees and not a place where customers 
were reasonably anticipated or expected to go. 
Of his own volition, plaintiff left the vicinity where 
customers were served and went through the narrow 
passage behind the counter, ignoring or not observing 
the posted sign, and walked fifteen to eighteen feet, 
practically the entire length of the liquor counter, and 
had already obtained on tip toes a card of pencils, 
exhibited for display, from above the liquor shelves. 
These shelves were seven or eight feet fro1n the floor, 
where most people could not even reach without the 
aid of a stool or ladder. 
When Mrs. Cannon, leaving the customer she 'vas 
waiting on, went to retrieve him as courteously as she 
could, he was already there, and in that position in the 
very location where he stepped into the hole. He was 
already a trespasser or equivalent when she arrived. 
It was not through Mrs. Cannon!s act, or any of the 
clerks, that he became a trespasser or that he was in-
duced into the very position where he fell. 
What approach to the situation could be taken by 
any of the clerks was a problem created by plaintiff's 
own wrongful conduct in going there. When plaintiff was 
already there with pencils in hand, it was not required, 
or necessary of Mrs. Cannon, at least upon first ap-
proach, or first utterance to try to force or order plain-
tiff out at the risk that such approach might be. inter-
preted as an attitude of accusation or suggestive that 
plaintiff did not intend to pay for the display mer-
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chandise he held. 
It should be remembered it 'vas by reason of plain-
tiff's trespass that l\Irs. C~annon was faced with the 
problem of ushering him out as tactfully as she could. 
She had no authority to per1nit plaintiff, or any cus-
tomer, to go or ren1ain behind the counter, and the fact 
that she approached the situation in a courteous manner 
should not operate to relieve plain tiff of his trespass 
or wanderings into the very position where he felL 
Even had plaintiff been im1nediately ordered out, 
there is no assurance he 'vould have obeyed or that he 
would not have fallen, or that he would not have in any 
event taken sufficient time to have reached up on the 
top of the shelves, seven or eight feet, to replace the 
card, as he did do the very moment he stepp·ed back 
and into the hole. He had previously ignored the posted 
signs and warnings given on two or three prior occa-
sions, 'vhen he went inside the prescription room, and 
there is no assurance that he, plaintiff, would have 
heeded an immediate order to return to the store proper. 
Furthermore, there had not really been sufficient time 
or opportunity to courteously extricate plaintiff, when 
he fell, while reaching to replace the card which he had 
removed from the shelf. 
There was no advantage to defendant in plaintiff's 
being behind the counter and trespassing as he did. 
Pencils were available in the self-help portion of the 
store proper where customers were allowed. Any pur-
chase of pencils could have been properly solicited there, 
or if plaintiff desired to look at the pencils displayed 
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above the liquor shelves, he had only to ask one of the 
clerks for permission to examine them. This did not 
require his going behind the counter. Other customers 
did not. 
We submit that the conduct of Mrs. Cannon in 
attempting to get him out o'f there as quickly as possible 
could not in any sense of the word be sufficient to convert 
plaintiff from the status of trespasser. 
Even if there was any for1n of implied permission, 
plaintiff would under the circumstances still be no n1ore 
than a permissive licensee, and plaintiff could not re-
cover because there is no duty on the part of a store 
owner to "keep his property safe for * * * mere licen-
sees." S.ee Collins v. Sprague's Benson Pharmacy, 124 
Neb. 210, 245 N.W. 602. The instruction, therefore, could 
not in any sense be termed prejudicial in not specifically 
embracing the term "licensee." The principal issues 
joined as shown by the evidence were before the. jury, 
and the instruction substantially and clearly set forth 
the issue of whether plaintiff was a trespasser. 
There was no active negligence or claim of active 
negligence on the part of defendant. The only claim 
was passive negligence or defective premises, and plain-
tiff's injuries were precipitated either by his own negli-
gence or his own trespass in to the portion of the store 
not designed or intended for customers. 
Unless the jury accepted plaintiff's theory presented 
at the trial therefore, namely, that he, plaintiff, asked 
for a pencil at the counter in the self-help department 
and was thereafter directed and accompanied by a clerk 
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into the location and position where he fell behind the 
counter, then plaintiff was a trespasser or equivalent 
in going where he knew he was not supposed to go. If 
any conduct along the 'vay, or at any time could have 
amounted to an invitation, such theory was liberally 
set forth in the Court's Instructions 5 to 7 inclusive, 
which should be constr~ted together with the Court's 
Instruction No. 9, and in light of the theories of the 
parties as presented at the trial. 
AUTHORITIES 
It is significant that the .instruction complained of 
states the la'v as defined by Paragraphs 329, 330 and 332 
of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, quoted In Re 
Wimmer's Estate, 111 Utah 444, 182 Pac. (2d) 119, se); 
forth page 11, Appellant's Brief, as follows: 
"A trespasser is defined as a 'person who 
enters or remains upon land in possession of 
another 'vithout a privilege to do so created by 
the possessor's consent, or otherwise.' " 
The la'v is well established that: 
"One who enters the premises of another as 
a trespasser or mere licensee does so a.t his own 
risk, and the owner owes him no duty to keep· 
the premises in a safe condition. His only duty 
is to abstain from wanton or wilful injury. Gian-
nini v. Campodonico, 176 Cal. 548, 169 P. 80; 
Schmidt v. Bauer, 80 Cal. 565, 22 P. 256, 5 L.R.A. 
580; Herzog v. Hemphill, 7 Cal. App. 116, 93 P. 
899; Brown v. Pepperdine, 53 Cal. App. 334, 200 
P. 36; Roberts v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 102 
Cal. App. 422·; 283 P. 353; Kirkpatrick v. Dami-
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80. 
ankes, supra ; Koppelman v. Ambassador Hotel 
Co., supra." Demmer v. City of Eureka (Cal.), 
178 Pac. (2d) 472. 
See also Robbins v. Yellow Cab (Cal.), 223 Pac. (2d) 
See also Bird v. Clover Leaf-Harris Dairy, 102 Utah 
330, 125 Pac. ( 2d) 797, wherein Justice Wolfe says : 
"The owner was under no duty to keep his 
proprty safe for trespassers or mere licensees.'' 
The opinion of the leading case of Bird v. Clover 
Leaf-Harris Dairy, supra, is not long, and so we here 
quote the principal portion of the opinion: 
"A question involved is this: Did the parking 
of the automobile under the canopy change the 
status of the one who parked it there from that 
of an invitee to that of a licensee, so far as 
injuries to the automobile as a result of being 
in that particular position are concerned' If a 
licensee, plaintiff is not entitled to recover in this 
case·. 
"The automobile was parked there by Mr. 
Bird's son, Montell. The latter tested milk for 
the Federated Milk Producers on the Dairy prem-
ises. There is no question about his being an 
invitee so far as his duties were concerned. How-
ever the use of the automobile was not necessary 
to those duties. Its use "\Vas a matter of con-
venience to himself in going to and from work. 
Sometimes he used a bicycle. 
"The dairy furnished ample parking space 
for workers and visitors to the· plant. Montell 
did not park in this space, although he knew of 
it. The reason he gave for parking where he did 
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is that he saw other cars parked there and did not 
know that it was not to be used as a parking 
place. The canopy was in two parts : an east 
and a west. The \vest part covered entrances to a 
garage or barn where the company delivery 
trucks were stored 'vhen not in use. The east 
part covered the side of the garage used for 
repair purposes. There 'vere no entrances here. 
Under this .part of the canopy the company 
parked its trucks when they were in need of 
repair. It does not appear that !1:ontell Bird 
knew of this fact, although he had worked there 
more than a year. It was against company orders 
to park cars other than delivery trucks under 
the canopy any place; but the employees dis-
obeyed this order and parked under the east 
'ving of the canopy. It does not appear that 
~fontell Bird kne\v of these company orders. 
"On the day of the accident some of the Hm-
ployees had parked their automobiles, contrary 
to orders, under the east "\Ving of the canopy. 
Their machines, too, were injured when the can-
opy and wall fell. 1\fontell had parked his father's 
automobile under the west "\ving directly in front 
of sliding doors closing an entrance to one of 
the storage places for delivery trucks. Accord-
ing to his testimony he did so because he assumed 
from seeing other cars parked under the canopy 
that such space could be so used. He knew, how-
ever, that trucks would have to be stored there 
later in the day, but he expected to be away be-
fore they came. 
"We believe his assumption was unwarrant-
ed. Even though the parking of automobiles un-
der the east canopy where there were no doors, 
might have misled the uninitiated into believing 
that such space was intended for general parking 
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purposes, it is rather a stretch of reasoning to 
believe that the space in front of the garage doors 
was intended for parking purposes. That is not 
common sense. The very fact that there were 
doors here was a warning that it was not a park-
ing place. The fact that the other cars were 
parked under the canopy at places where there 
were no doors would impress the average person 
with the thought that the garage entrance should 
be left clear. 
"We believe plaintiff's case is founded upon 
a fallacy. An invitee must use the owner's prem-
ises in the usual, ordinary, and customary way. 
20 R.C.L. 68, Sec. 59. It cannot be said that to 
shut off the owner's use of its garage is the usual, 
ordinary, and customary way contemplated for 
the public. When Montell Bird so parked, he be-
came, so far as parking the car was concerned, 
at best a mere licensee, and took that part of the 
premises as he found them. 
".,* * * It may be· laid down as a general rule 
that the liability of the owner of the premises ex-
tends no further than the invitation.' 14 L.R.A., 
N.S., 1119, and cases therein cited. See also, 17 
Ann. Cas. 591. 
"As to the duty to a licensee see 20 R.C.L. 57, 
Sec. 53. 
"This disposes of the case. We shall not dis-
cuss the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The judg-
nlent of the lower court is vacated and set aside, 
and the case ren1anded with directions to the 
lower court to enter a judgment of no cause of 
action." 
When the evidence in the instant case is undisputed 
that customers were not permitted behind the counter, 
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and none "~ere kno,vn to have indulged in such practice, 
and plaintiff adn1ittedly kne'v he was not permitted there 
and previously 'varned "Then in the prescription depa.rt-
nlent, certainly the instant case presents a stronger cas~ 
against plaintiff than the Bird case, where the court held 
as a n1atter of la'v that plaintiff was not entitled to re-
cover. 
This distinction also differentiates the instant case 
from the situation suggested by Justice Wolfe in his 
dissenting opinion, wherein he points out at pages 334-5 
of the Utah Report that: 
"Where custom, necessity or other circum-
stances are such that an invitee may reasonably 
presume that the invitation held out to him to 
come on the premises includes one's vehicle which 
he might ordinarily be expected to use in reaching 
the premises, he 1nay place the vehicle on such 
portion of the pre1nises during the period of his 
inviteeship as is not specifically or by apparent 
circumstances excluded from the scope of the in-
vitation." 
and suggests further on down the sa1ne page that the 
owner should refrain under such circumstances "from 
committing active negligence when he is aware of the 
trespasser's negligence." 
In the instant case, the area behind the counter was 
specifically and by apparent circun1stances excluded 
from the scope of in~tation. Other customers did not 
use the portion of the store sectioned off by the counters, 
and plaintiff was there wholly without reason or excuse. 
There was no active negligence. 
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The case of Hayward v. Downing, et al, 112 Utah 
508, 189 Pa.c. (2d) 442, referred to pages 12-14 Appel-
lant's Brief, is clearly distinguishable from the instant 
case in that the plain tiffs in that case, watching a wres-
tling match at the coliseum, were sitting on a platform 
and in a place where they had express permission to sit 
and where they and other patrons had sat throughout 
the course of the winter. "As usual, they had purchased 
tickets and had secured permission from Mr. Downing to 
sit there." The court made it clear the holding was 
"limited strictly to the facts." The opinion is helpful 
in relation to the instant case in reference to custon1ers 
upon store premises, wherein the court stated as fol-
lows: 
"A person may be an invitee as to a part of 
the premises, and a mere licensee or trespasser 
as to other parts of the premises. A common ex-
ample of this is a store. As a general rule the 
public is invited to enter the store for the purpose 
of transacting business. However, this invitation 
ordinarily extends only to that part of the store 
where goods are displayed for sale and business 
is ordinarily transacted. Generally, the public is 
not invited to enter the stockrooms, furnace 
rooms, and other parts of the store, and if persons 
go to these parts of the premises they lose their 
status as invitees and become mere licensees or 
trespassers. 38 Am. J ur. 761. Negligence, Sec. 
100. See also Lawand v. California Products Co., 
9 Cal. App. (2d) 147, 48 P. 2d 979." 
Plaintiff's position behind the counter was not a 
place where business was ordinarily conducted or where 
any customers were allowed. It was comparable to the 
prescription room, stock roon1s, furnace rooms, or other 
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parts of the store 'vhere custotuers 'vere not served. 
In Oettinger v. Stewart, et al, 24 Cal. (2d) 133, 148 
Pac. (2d) 19, referred to page 12 Appellant's Brief, 
plaintiff called at defendant's apartment house in Santa 
l\fonica to rent an apartn1ent. As she, plaintiff, was leav-
ing the premises, defendant, according to plaintiff's 
testimony, in stepping do,vn caught her foot and fell for-
'vard, striking plaintiff and knocking her, plaintiff, down. 
The court held plaintiff 'vas an invitee as a matter of 
law, inasmuch as the scope of the original invitation in-
cluded her right to leave the premises. While the court 
did criticize some of defendant's requested instructions, 
which in effect stated that if plaintiff became a "'li-
censee,' the only duty to her then is to refrain from wil-
ful or wanton injury." The reason for such criticism, 
however, was based upon some decisions which apply a 
rule of reasonable care where the negligence of defendant 
is active as distinguished from a defective condition of 
the premises. In the latter instance, the court pointed 
out the uniform rule that the only duty to a licensee "is 
to abstain from wilful or wanton injury." 
Again we point out that the instant case, being one 
of defective condition of the premises, the only duty even 
if plaintiff could be deemed a licensee was to not wilfully 
or wantonly injure, as the trial court in substance in-
structed. 
The case of Skerl v. Willow Creek Coal Co., 92 Utah 
474, 69 Pac. (2d) 502, page 11 Appellant's Brief, is dis-
tinguishable from the instant case in that the children 
were clearly invited into the mine in the first instance. 
After getting inside, serious injuries 'vere inflicted due 
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to a powder explosion. The invitation was extended by 
Glen Jackson, one of defendant's employees, who had 
charge of the cutting and remo:val of the coal from the 
mine, and with the tacit approval of a Mr. Howard, presi-
dent, at the entrance, who had charge of outside opera-
tions. Jackson, in the course of his duties had taken 
others through the mine. While the evidence offered by 
defendant to the effect that plaintiff was warned not to 
go in pres en ted a conflict, the court held that there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find there was implied, 
if not actual permission. In the instant case, if there 
was any evidence of implied permission, as we have seen, 
plaintiff's theory was fully and adequately presented to 
the jury. 
In Wimmer v. Bamberger R. Co., 111 Utah 444, 182 
Pac. (2d) 119, from which appellant quoted page 11 of 
his brief, the court said : 
"A brief reference to the facts will disclose 
that the deceased when he attempted to retrieve 
his hat was either a trespasser or a business visi-
tor. The controlling element in determining his 
status was whether or not under the facts of this 
case the deceased was invited or permitted to go 
upon the car at the tim~ he met his death. If at 
the time wnd place he was not privileged to get 
on the car, then he would be a trespasser." 
In Trafford v. Hammacher, Schlemmer & Co., Inc., 
71 N.Y.S. (2d) 878, a judgment in favor of plaintiff was 
reversed. The substance of the case is contained in the 
following quotation: 
"The defendant supplied main and adequate 
aisles for the use of customers. It was under no 
duty to anticipate a customer would deviate there-
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front and use the very small, short passageway 
intended for the use of its en1ployees in arranging 
the rugs. Plaintiff's deviation and use of the 
small passage\vay '"a8 her voluntary act, and in 
doing so, she "Tas guilty of contributory negli-
gence, if negligence there 'vas." 
In Francis v. Cleveland Drug Co., (N. C.) 55 S. E. 
(2d) 499, a judg~nent of non-suit was sustained where 
plaintiff, a patron at a drugstore, after seeing so1ne one, 
not an employee of defendant, go to a refrigerator in a 
small storage roo1n adjoining the prescription roorn and 
get a Coca Cola, proceeded to do like\vise, and in under-
taking to place the en1pty bottle on a shelf, fell into an 
open stairway. The roon1 not being for the accommoda-
tion of customers and not being invited therein, plain-
tiff could not recover. 
Plaintiff's Own Negligence 
\vnatever his status when plantiff undertook to go 
behind the liquor counter, a place he knew customers 
did not go, and walked 13-15 feet, the entire length to the 
vicinity of the man hole, he had a duty to take heed and 
observe the floor and the path he was taking. Even a 
casual observation would have revealed its presence. 
1\frs. Cannon saw it, and she thought plaintiff saw it. 
Light meter tests taken adn1ittedly under the same con-
ditions around the hole and Inoulding showed readings 
up to ten foot candles as to the north half or portion of 
the hole, and approxi1nately five foot candles on the ex-
treme south edge, which was shaded by the counter. The 
major portion of the hole, therefore, was substantially 
better lighted than the amount of light reconnnended for 
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hotel lobbies or school corridors, namely, five foot can-
dles (R. 201, 202). There was plenty of light to easily 
see the hole ( R. 203). 
Plaintiff was either negligent in not looking and 
observing, or in the other alternative, knowing the hole 
was there, carelessly stepping back and into the hole. 
Reaching on his tip toes attempting to replace the dis-
play card, the latter seems probable. 
In Knox v. Snow, ______ Utah ______ , 229 Pac. (2d) 874, 
plaintiff, while on defendant's service station for busi-
ness purposes, undertook to look over some tires on a 
rack on the far end of the shop, and while doing so, step-
ped or slipped into the grease pit. Deeming it not neces-
sary to decide the issue of defendant's negligence or 
plaintiff's status, this court affirmed defendant's motion 
for a non-suit solely on the· basis of plaintiff's own negli-
gence. The court pointed out that plaintiff was required 
"to pay some heed to the floor of the shop and the path 
he traveled." 
In Thompson v. Bea.rd & Gabelman, (Kan.) 216 Pac. 
(2d) 798, plaintiff was a customer in defendant's dress 
shop having selected two dresses, and at the direction of 
a sales lady, then busy serving another customer, went 
to a fitting room at the rear of the store. There we-re 
two curtained doorways and plaintiff entered, thinking 
she had the fitting room, and found herself in a small 
office containing a chair and a desk with a lighted lamp 
upon it. Noticing the door slightly ajar and thinking it 
was the fitting room there, she entered, but advanced 
only a few steps when she fell down the stairs sustaining 
the injuries for which she brought the action. The court 
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held the evidence \vas not sufficient on which to establish 
a cause of action. Plaintiff's own contributory negligence 
and the further reason as stated by the court at page 802 
as follows: 
"It cannot be said that defendant. failed to 
exercise ordinary care for the safety of its custo-
mers by failing to anticipate that some customer 
might 'vander from the main part of the store 
into that portion of the premises not adapted to 
customer's use but reserved for the management 
and its employees." 
CONCLUSION 
If plaintiff was not a trespasser or licensee or con-
tributorily negligent as a n1atter of law, which we submit 
he was, then 1nost certainly the verdict is sup·ported by 
substantial and convincing evidence, and the instructions 
based upon the theory of both parties in the light of the 
testimony given at the trial and the existing circum-
stances, on the whole fairly presented sttch isswes, wnd 
taken as a whole were favorable to plaintiff. 
It should be remembered plaintiff was injured by 
reason of his own voluntary conduct in getting behind 
the counter where he knew customers were not permitted. 
He ignored previous warnings. 
All presumptions should be in favor of affirming 
the verdict and judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEW ART, CANNON & HANSON 
E. F. BALDWIN, JR. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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